NCTC - Adding to Chaos?

National Counter Terrorism Centre is expected to be functional on 1^st March 2012. The agency was originally meant to be on the lines of United States of America’s NCTC. However, this NCTC is similar to its American namesake only as far as its name is concerned. What was originally meant to be a mother of all agencies involved in counter-terrorism intelligence gathering today seems like an agency lacking insight and originality.

In its present state, the agency is flawed on two major grounds – one, it can potentially further vitiate India’s fiercely competitive intelligence apparatus due to its overlapping mandate with other agencies; and two, it takes away any local agency’s ‘first right to react.’ The latter is what the a few states are openly and aggressively opposing by calling NCTC an assault on federal autonomy.

The NCTC was originally meant to include Intelligence Bureau’s Multi Agency Centre (MAC), Operational wings of the IB and RAW, National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Security Guards (NSG), Finance ministry investigation units such as CBDT and Financial Investigation Unit, Defence Ministry’s Military Intelligence under its fold. Both the defence and the finance ministries had expressed serious reservations with parting of its own investigative wings.

As on today NCTC will be under the IB, which will be headed by a newly appointed Additional Director IB. It has been formed under the existing Unlawful Activities (prevention) Act. (Quoting from the letter written by Tamil Nadu chief minister Jayalalitha) “The officers of the Operations Division of the NCTC shall have the power to arrest and the power to search under Section 43A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. It will also have the power to set up inter State Intelligence Support Teams (INSIST). The NCTC shall, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this Order, have the power to seek information, including documents, reports, transcripts, cyber information and information of every other kind in whatever form, from any agency furnishing or obliged to furnish such information. The agency furnishing or obliged to furnish the information may do so under such conditions of confidentiality as may be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.”

The question arises whether it is a counter-terrorism agency or an investigating agency or an intelligence agency. If NCTC is to be under the Intelligence Bureau, then it would perhaps to better to create an investigation wing under the Intelligence Bureau as against creating a whole new agency.

In an already over-crowded Intelligence setup, NCTC will be the fourth major anti-terrorism body after the NATGRID, NIA and NSG. Even as NATGRID and NIA will function independent of NCTC, one must not forget that every state has its own dedicated counter terrorism unit with dangerously overlapping mandates. In such a scenario one wonders what is that one new feature which that makes it absolutely necessary for India to have one more counter terrorism agency. If all these agencies together or even independent of each other have been able to tackle the menace of terrorism only to a particular extent, there is little chance that the formation of NCTC in its current form would make India terror proof.

While the states are opposing NCTC on the grounds of federal autonomy, for a ground level intelligence officer, it’s a case of too many cooks spoiling the broth. NCTC is mandated with two powers which will potentially prove to be a bane of existence for NCTC itself, as well as others operating in the same space.

The memo issued by the home ministry states that “The officers of the Operations Division of the NCTC shall have the power to arrest and the power to search under Section 43A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.”

Be it NIA, local ATS, CBI, Enforcement Directorate, DRI, or local police – every single state level or central agency has as similar or exact mandate. Agencies like NIA and Maharashtra or Gujarat ATS are like mirror images of what the proposed NCTC is as they are already exercising the power of search, seizure and arrest under the UAPA as well as gathering counter terrorism inputs. One doesn’t expect NCTC to anything drastically different from those with which it will have to co-exist.

Home Ministry had announced the formation of NIA weeks after 26/11 attacks with a similar intention. From first person accounts, I have gathered the NIA is still trying to find its footing. For instance NIA is facing severe manpower crunch, hostility from regional anti-terror units, absence of a credible and exclusive data base of informers and suspects. Barring a few independent fake currency cases in the North East and the Delhi Blast case, NIA is now looking into cases which are handed over from either a local investigation unit or the CBI. In such a scenario, it is doubtful if things would be any different for the NCTC.

Cross over to NCTC. NCTC’s primary concentration would be on both intelligence and investigation related to counter terrorism. On the same mandate of counter terrorism, agencies like Delhi Special Cell and Maharashtra ATS are seen to step into each-other’s area of operation fatally affecting a potentially successful operation, it is very unlikely that NCTC will be an exception. If NCTC has to justify its existence it will have to snatch someone else’s pie. It will otherwise find it difficult to justify the power to search, seize and arrest.

The home ministry has suggested that specialised officers from the IB will be absorbed in the NCTC. The same officers who would earlier co-ordinate with state level agencies will now be staunch opponents. Operators, irrespective of which agency they belong to, will be vying for the same terror suspect, same piece of evidence, and the same informer. One example of this is the manner in which Malegaon 2006 case has shaped up. The case has been under investigation by multiple agencies – from local Malegaon police to Maharashtra ATS to the CBI (twice) and now with the NIA. While the NIA is trying hard to unravel new evidence in the same areas which have been investigated previously, it is also trying to buy out informers from IB or Military Intelligence, first by threatening informers with arrest and then later bullying the informers to work for them. This is by and large a common practice adopted by investigating agencies. However, one more in the fray won’t really ensure some path breaking information. An informer works for money and loyalty. While he may take money from more than one agency, he is known to share the crucial information or lead with whom he is most loyal to. NCTC will have an uphill task on that front.

The government is perhaps hoping that with the induction of IB officials into the NCTC it will also ensure some degree of smoothness in sharing of inter-agency intelligence and informers. There appears to have assumed something in theory which is perhaps not a very sound practical solution. For most of the intelligence operators, intelligence input is like a girl friend that they would never want to part with.

The second aspect of NCTC’s mandate is – “The NCTC shall have the power to seek information, including documents, reports, transcripts, cyber information and information of every other kind in whatever form, from any agency furnishing or obliged to furnish such information. The agency furnishing or obliged to furnish the information may do so under such conditions of confidentiality as may be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.”

Simply put in a lay man’s language, this part of the mandate means – you (local police and ATS units) go ahead and do the ground work, gather evidence, tap resources, source out documents etc. and We (NCTC) will feed from your hard work and take over the case and then claim victory. This part of the NCTC’s power is and will directly affect the morale of officers working on the ground. Potentially talented officers may even cease to work if ultimately all their hard work is going to be handed over to someone else. Assuming that some officers are willing to join NCTC on deputation, chances of their parent agencies relieving them are very bleak. After all which agency will want its star investigator to leave for the benefit of some other investigating force? Classic example is that of NIA which had initially taken officers from the CBI and local police. While the CBI has nearly stopped sending their man to NIA on deputation, local police is dealing with inter departmental transfer conflicts.

If launched, NCTC will have to feed on the leftovers of other agencies. Its leaders will have to coax the government to handover cases from other agencies in order to justify its existence. Assuming cases are forcefully taken away from local investigating teams, important cases are bound to face delays, and quality of investigation will suffer.

No investigator worth his salt joins forces merely for law and order maintenance. It is the kick of investigation and thrill of the unravelling terror conspiracies, joining the dots which lead you right up to the terrorist that serve as incentives for the officers to keep going.


By all accounts, NCTC appears to be a half-baked organisation with dangerously overlapping mandates. It may serve well for the government to not hasten its launch and add to the existing chaos within the intelligence set up. Rather Home ministry should review the form and format of the agency. Ideally NCTC should be made independent of all the agencies with the main objective of co-ordinating, collating and analysing the intelligence inputs gathered from the various agencies across the country. It should report directly the PMO with ‘action to be taken’ recommendations.

Advantages –

Informers will not have a dearth of agencies. If he is unhappy with one agency, he can very well go to another. Most informers are known to do this. Now they will have one more agency’s coffers to dip into.

Because it will be under the Intelligence Bureau NCTC will not have a problem in accessing intelligence archives. The IB will be bound to share a good chunk of data. 

Reporter's Diary: Stepping into History.

Reproducing notes (unedited) from my notebook which I had written after I visited Gulberg Society for the first time in 2006 or 2007 (i cannot remember correctly). I was so affected that just sat in one corner and penned these thoughts. I had headlined it as 'Stepping into History' 

The moment i saw those rusted doors of Gulberg society, i sensed an invitation. Invitation from history. I walked up to the doors, half expecting to see disgruntled and shattered families, half naked kids running helter skelter, some old men squatting in a group, women going about their chores.. But reality is not so routine. The gates  opened on to a deserted era in  history. Crumbling buildings, vacant rooms, broken walls, locks, abandoned motorcycles, rusted rods, cobwebs, weeds, shrubs and shadows. Each wall, each door, each padlock, every broken electric meter, all the dried taps, abandoned steps... the air, sunlight, earth every element of this chapter in history was patiently waiting for a visitor like me to come and listen to their stories.

As a part of the research for my assignment i had read up all that was available to try understand the silence of Gulberg. Around 300 muslims were killed, brutally murdered, raped, split opened reportedly by hindu fanatics during the 2002 Gujarat riots. I had read every petition, every statement, every piece of evidence connected to the Gulberg massacre.

Nothing can justify what happened then. But as Jose Saramago puts it, " Its easy enough to give reasons for what we do or don't do. When we see that we haven't got a reason or not enough of a reason, then we try to invent one."

Clearly a reason had been created. A reason accepted by the Hindus. A reason Muslims were forced to accept. I was standing inside the ruins of Gulberg Society. I felt dead, indifferent and perhaps unaffected. These massively complicated terms like Hindus, Muslims, secular, communal etc are beyond my limited understanding. What happened then, I can only imagine, or sympathise with it. I can never actually feel what the victims must have felt. 

What surprises me is that in the name of justice, Ngo's are cashing in on the victims, petition after petition are being filed, accepted and dismissed. Court dates are sought to either create, destroy or alter evidence. Statements are recorded to know where to alter the truth. Political promises are made because its fashionable. And now even the victims have started exaggerating with the idea that a great amount of exaggeration will at least fetch minimal justice.

The New Agency In Town

This piece first appeared in the May 1st issue of Pragati. http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2010/05/the-new-agency-in-town/

Soon after the audacious 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram announced the formation of National Investigation Agency (NIA) as the  central counter-terrorism law enforcement agency of India. Modelled after the FBI, the NIA is claimed to be “not merely a post-incident investigating agency, but also a pre-incident disruption agency.”

However this has led to considerable unease amongst the rank and file of various other central and state counter-terrorism agencies—Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the specialised state Anti-Terrorism Squads (ATS). A large number of questions have been raised by the sceptics about the exact role of NIA, its status vis-à-vis the others, availability of trained staff and access to archival intelligence. There have been fears that the new agency will undermine the established ones. Indeed, there is a school of thought that holds that the formation of the NIA only adds another player to the already established intelligence setup in India, making the inter-agency bureaucratic wars even murkier; and instead, it would have been far more prudent to strengthen the existing agencies with better resources—logistical, technical, economical and staffing.

It must be noted that other than offences of terrorism, the NIA will also deal with counterfeit currency, human trafficking, narcotics or drug, organised crime, aircraft hijacking, violations of the Atomic Energy Act and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The agency is under greater public scrutiny due to the circumstances and the promises surrounding its formation. It is currently handling eight cases, the most important among them being the case of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives David Coleman Headley and Tahawwur Rana. Although it has not secured any major breakthrough in any of the eight cases, the home minister is believed to be promoting the fledgeling agency as the lead investigator in all terror-related incidents. The challenge for the agency is to sustain, survive and succeed not on the personal support of the incumbent home minister but on its own merit in the future.

As a new agency, the NIA is not yet staffed to its authorised strength. At present all the officials with the NIA are on deputation and any new recruitment in the near future will also have to be on deputation from the central agencies or the state police forces. Even the CBI, which also draws its staff from officers on deputation from various services, is operating 35 percent below strength. In particular it is suffering from chronic shortages among its senior officers and investigators.

The situation in most state police departments is no better. Due to an acute shortage of manpower in the parent cadres, the states are not willing to spare their better officers, leave alone their best ones, for the NIA. The founder NIA chief had requisitioned over a dozen officers from various Crime Bureaus months ago but that request has not yet been fully met.

Tthe government can overcome this crisis by exercising the option of enforced deputation with the NIA. It must be mandatory for all central and state agencies, with the exception of the IB and R&AW, to depute a few selected officers of special skill sets from selected branches and district headquarters to the NIA. This will allow the latter to gain a local foothold, which is essential for gathering intelligence using local human intelligence sources. These officers will also serve as bridges between the NIA and the Anti-Terrorist Squads of various state police forces.

Deputation, however, can only be a temporary measure to get the agency up and running at the earliest. To fulfil its mission, the NIA must recruit directly.

Both the IB and the R&AW have an enviable pool of resources, archives, access and processes required for gathering intelligence within and outside the country. To make the system optimally effective, the government must centralise and co-ordinate intelligence input. While the IB and R&AW can continue doing they are best at—gathering intelligence—the NIA, empowered by a special act and the power to prosecute can play an important role in ensuring speedy trials and higher rates of convictions. As the NIA matures over a period of time, one of its wings must be dedicated to strengthening the intrinsic intelligence-gathering ability of the agency.

It is no secret that India’s top two intelligences agencies—the IB & R&AW—have been in severe competition with each other. The entry of the NIA as another player into this turf war will further complicate matters. To manage this dynamic, the government must put in place an institutionalised arrangement where selected NIA officers are allowed access to the libraries of RAW and the IB. Providing access to these libraries will result in sharing of intelligence inputs such as the voice samples, marked telephone numbers under surveillance, dossiers on terrorists, gangsters, money launderers and other suspects, technical and scientific infrastructure, network of selective informants in the remotest parts of the country, and other databanks. This access must be provided at least until the NIA establishes, equips and populates its own archives sufficiently.

Now, for both professional and organisational reasons, it is unlikely that any agency would easily be willing to share its archives with another. As unrestricted access would be practically impossible, specialised IB and R&AW officials must train selected NIA officials.

Although the total fund allocation for the NIA is still to be declassified, reports suggest that approximately Rs 400-500 million have been allocated on an annual basis. Even as large budgetary allocations are a necessity in these initial years, the government must ensure that these finances are used judiciously to deliver better results. The NIA must ensure that these funds are utilised to provide the agency with a logistically, technically and scientifically sound basis in the formative years.

There are many challenges—from bureaucratic turf wars to the fight for resources—for a new agency like the NIA before it can carve a niche for itself. As it is considered as the home minister’s pet project, it should be able to overcome a lot of these challenges. The final benchmarks of its success, however, will be performance and delivery.

you can visit NIA on http://www.nia.gov.in/index.aspx

Review - Death in Mumbai.

PS – With all due respect to the author as an Editor / Journalist. Am writing this as a journalist. But for a regular reader, the book may be as interesting as any. However, here is my impression. 

It was both the author and the subject of the book which compelled me go ahead and order a rupees 224 worth ‘Death in Mumbai’ by Meenal Baghel. It turned out to be a not-so-good investment. Meenal Bhaghel, whose reputation as a writer / editor precedes her, disappoints as an author of a non-fiction book. ‘Death in Mumbai’ publicised as a ‘gripping account of infamous Neeraj Grover killing that sent shockwaves through the nation’ fails on the very count of it being a ‘gripping account.’

After a first couple of chapters, the reader can potentially forget whether this is a book on the Neeraj Grover murder or whether this a PR exercise piece on Mumbai’s Oshiwara, Ekta kapoor, Moon Das, or Ramgopal Varma. One does not understand why the author needed to introduce Rakesh Maria, current chief of Maharashtra’s Anti Terrorism Squad, with a whole page of details of 1993 blast case. I mean everyone knows who Rakesh Maria is. But for the benefit of those who don’t know the officer, perhaps a more recent reference would have have worked. In any case I do not see the reason in glorifying Rakesh Maria. As a non-fictional narrative of a murder, the book could have done with a more matter of fact introduction for the officer. But if you go by the book, I’d prefer a page full of introduction on who Rakesh Maria is as against chapters dedicating or glorifying tinsel world characters like Ekta Kapoor, Moon Das, and Ram Gopal Varma!

More than 100 pages into the book you are still waiting for a first person account of either Maria Susairaj or Jerome. But all you get is just a few lines here and here snatched from chance conversations during the court hearings. From the book, the only thing that you get as a reader is an idea of the personas that are Maria, Jerome and Neeraj. Large part of the narrative of the incident itself is done through the witnesses or the chargesheet that has been filed. One keeps wishing for that quintessential first person account. But that never comes. While it could have been difficult but not impossible to get Jerome to speak to the author, I believe that convincing Maria would have worked. As a journalist who has covered the case, I can say with certainty that Maria could have spoken if pursued consistently.

Again based on my journalistic experience of covering the case, I was left wishing for snippets which bring life into a long form narrative of just another love triangle gone bad. For instance, with reference to the portion where its written that at the fag end of the trial Maria had started putting on weight and was surviving on chocolates, there is a very interesting story which could have found mention in the book. A young boy would always come for the hearings bringing a bag full of chocolates and other essentials both for Maria and Jerome. For the longest time Maria used to pay for Jerome’s expenses as well. However Maria had stopped paying as the trial progressed and both the defense lawyers squarely blamed on each other’s client. As a reader I want to know how the status of relationship between the two lovers or had they become former lovers?

I also found myself disagreeing with the character build-up of Maria and Jerome. The author appears to have used adjectives to paint a negative picture of Maria and a charming but angry young man image of the naval lieutenant. Through the narrative the author appears to singularly blame Maria. As a journalist, but more as a woman, I feel that Maria alone cannot be blamed. Both Maria and Jerome are at fault.

On the up side, there appears to be an effort to meet people connected with Maria and Neeraj’s side of the story. The author beautifully describes the point where the investigators break the Maria Susairaj to the point of her confession. The book also successfully gives an insight into the functioning of the world of television and its obsessions.  

All in all for me, the book comes across as a forced narrative of an incident. 

1993 Blasts Sentenced - Life or Death.

Iqbal Shaikh was an associate of Tiger Memon, one of the key accused of the 1993 blasts.

'Please take me to the doctor..." is all that he managed to say.  He was Iqbal shaikh, accused number 23 in the thick fat files of 1993 Bombay Blast Case. Little did he know that even the doctor could do nothing for his ‘life,’ especially against the law of land that has sentenced him to death.

His guilt: he was present when RDX was being laden in the vehicles and parking a scooter laden with RDX that failed to explode.

For this weak and falling man, breathing was more of an obligation than a necessity. An indifferent look, unkempt beard, failing health and a gradually eroding sanity added the fatal blows to his already frail body and mind that had gotten weaker with every court date for more than a decade now. I am told that hardly anyone ever came to visit him in all the 14 years that he spent in the prison. His loneliness is evident in his empty eyes. He is incapable of thought. He suffers from psychological neurosis.

And so when TADA judge P D Kode announced, ‘you are sentenced to death for your role in conspiracy of the 1993 Bombay Bomb Blast Case,’ Reality did not hit him. It took the presence of two well-built constables to pick up this man who was lying like a lump on the bench in a corner bench of the now historical TADA court. All he kept pleading with joined hands was, ‘judge sahib please mujhe doctor ke paas le jaiye… koi meri sunn nahin raha hai...’ (Judge Sahib please take me to a doctor, no one is listening to me...)  As per procedure the court registrar communicates the order to him, ‘tumko death sentence diya hai.’ It doesn’t matter to Iqbal Shaikh. He keeps pleading, ‘mujhe doctor ke paas le chaliye.’ Slowly but firmly the constables drag him out of the court. Witness to the moments of history, I suddenly feel teardrops rolling down my cheeks.

After almost 14 years of waiting, the judgements and sentences were being handed out with unsual speed. After Accused number 23, it was the turn of accused no 112, a former Additional Commissioner of Customs S N Thappa. Unlike Shaikh, Thappa had been out on bail. Suffering from cancer, well built, monetarily sound with family members always waiting outside on every court date, and under regular observation of experts ensuring he gets the best treatment. One look at this hefty man, forever dressed in white, and I know that his legal moves and intentions are anything but white. With every hearing my doubts were only proven to be right.

His guilt: He allows the entry of RDX, and arms and ammunition into the city inspite of specific information.

His sentence: Life imprisonment.

Reason to quote Justice PD Kode: (oh!) he is already suffering from a ‘life threatening disease.’

It was at this point that the dichotomy of our judiciary hit me the most. In all the years that I have covered crime and legal proceedings, I had begun to understand that the Judiciary can never cease to surprise. But this was a learning lesson to the point of jolting me emotionally. Disgusted and angry I left the court wondering what kind of justice is this? My heart was buzzing with questions. One who is visibly almost dead is sentenced to death and the other is spared death because he is already suffering from a life threatening disease!! How can this be justified legally??? One might say Thappa will die any which ways. By that standard Iqbal Shaikh is no immortal, death is his end too. Then why should the judge ‘award’ death to the almost dead and ‘life’ to someone who is destined to die… like all of us.

Can death sentence be awarded (as the law books like to say) to someone who is not living at all? Does capital punishment serve any purpose now after 14 long years? Punishment is usually given as a deterrent, but we all know that Mumbai has suffered and survived more than 14 blasts in the last 14 years. All those who are dead are not coming back, and those alive have moved on. Most of the time when I have tried convincing blast victims for a television interview many have turned around and said, ‘let us move on.’ I doubt if most victims are even rooting for revenge. Life is fast and fears and doubts have changed manifold since 1993.

Most of those who have been given the death sentence perhaps have been punished enough by life in a way unique to each one. Having said that, some did deserve this harsh sentence but I wonder if it is justified for Iqbal Shaikh. I know that each one of them is appealing against the TADA order in the Supreme Court. And I also know that Iqbal Shaikh is not even aware that this option exists for him.

I wonder what Iqbal Shaikh must have gone through in that solitary barrack of Yerwada jail. I wonder if he was sane enough to even think in his last few solitary moments. All the experience that I have relied on to rationalize life, seems to have raised more questions than answer some…

That was also the day when I formed my ‘i-am-against-capital-punishment‘ opinion.

J Dey = Secrecy!

Nothing that J Dey did could be taken on a face value. In fact those who knew him or worked with him would only expect that the seemingly apparent is in fact nothing but just a cover.

I worked with J Dey in 2001 as a cub reporter in the Indian Express. J Dey was one of my reporting heads. But it was much later that i understood why J Dey never used the regular work station which was surrounded by work stations of other Express reporters, why J Dey never socialized much with anyone, why J Dey preferred standing in a corner and just keep observing. Why J dey always ate his snacks alone in the canteen. Much later did i understand J Dey = Secrecy.

And today as i went about gathering information on the progress in J Dey murder case investigation for Rediff.com, an additional commissioner level officer told me, “those who think they knew J Dey closely also knew only ten per cent of what he was..!!!’

I wasn’t surprised. Having worked with him i knew it was just not in Dey’s character to share any information with anyone. Even the editors only knew that he was working on ‘something’. They would get the whole story only when he was done working on it. Till then he demanded and got ‘non-interference’

But what’s really baffling the investigators is the level of secrecy that J Dey maintained. As investigations make headway, officers are stumbling upon some new information about the ‘gentle giant’ almost on an hourly basis. While it may not surprise us, it definitely intrigues many of us here in Mumbai’s crime reporter’s community.

He operated 4 email accounts and ensured never to send mails from one account to another, a practice that several of us follow. He had two cell phones, but almost always made certain that he never spoke long over the mobile. For longer conversations, he would use the public phone. He however received international calls. One may ask why would an over cautious man like J Dey avoid conversations from local numbers and talk at length on international calls? For one, those international calls were made using a VOIP facility. Secondly, as another IPS officer puts it, in most cases it was J Dey who was getting information (or instructions?)

That he made trips to United Kingdom and in specific to Ireland and Scotland was known only to very few people in his inner circle. But his information was shared only a couple of days before he embarked on the trip. He made no exception for his wife either.

Any spy agency in the world would have been proud of the spook that J Dey would have made.

When one is investigating and reporting on the murder of a seasoned crime reporter, one tends to get a lot of information. Information that is murky, suspicious, shocking, surprising, and even sensational among other things. While we reporters only get our tit bits of information as hearsay from the officers, it the cops who harbour every single piece of information. There are times when even the most seasoned investigator finds it difficult to draw lines. There are times when all bits of information is inter related. And i do get sense (mind you it’s only a hunch and not evidence) that the cops are struggling to view his professional and personal lives apart and independent of each other. For every new revelation on J dey’s professional life, there appears to be a corresponding development in his personal life. It is like a dominoes effect of one secret leading into another, another secret leading into yet another and soon the space is filled with revelations each leading from and on to the other secret.

While i refrain from commenting on J dey as a reporter, i can claim with certainty that his secrecy was legendary.

And it’s here that my math is bang on target J Dey = Secrecy.