NCTC - Adding to Chaos?

National Counter Terrorism Centre is expected to be functional on 1^st March 2012. The agency was originally meant to be on the lines of United States of America’s NCTC. However, this NCTC is similar to its American namesake only as far as its name is concerned. What was originally meant to be a mother of all agencies involved in counter-terrorism intelligence gathering today seems like an agency lacking insight and originality.

In its present state, the agency is flawed on two major grounds – one, it can potentially further vitiate India’s fiercely competitive intelligence apparatus due to its overlapping mandate with other agencies; and two, it takes away any local agency’s ‘first right to react.’ The latter is what the a few states are openly and aggressively opposing by calling NCTC an assault on federal autonomy.

The NCTC was originally meant to include Intelligence Bureau’s Multi Agency Centre (MAC), Operational wings of the IB and RAW, National Investigation Agency (NIA), National Security Guards (NSG), Finance ministry investigation units such as CBDT and Financial Investigation Unit, Defence Ministry’s Military Intelligence under its fold. Both the defence and the finance ministries had expressed serious reservations with parting of its own investigative wings.

As on today NCTC will be under the IB, which will be headed by a newly appointed Additional Director IB. It has been formed under the existing Unlawful Activities (prevention) Act. (Quoting from the letter written by Tamil Nadu chief minister Jayalalitha) “The officers of the Operations Division of the NCTC shall have the power to arrest and the power to search under Section 43A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. It will also have the power to set up inter State Intelligence Support Teams (INSIST). The NCTC shall, for the purposes of discharging its functions under this Order, have the power to seek information, including documents, reports, transcripts, cyber information and information of every other kind in whatever form, from any agency furnishing or obliged to furnish such information. The agency furnishing or obliged to furnish the information may do so under such conditions of confidentiality as may be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.”

The question arises whether it is a counter-terrorism agency or an investigating agency or an intelligence agency. If NCTC is to be under the Intelligence Bureau, then it would perhaps to better to create an investigation wing under the Intelligence Bureau as against creating a whole new agency.

In an already over-crowded Intelligence setup, NCTC will be the fourth major anti-terrorism body after the NATGRID, NIA and NSG. Even as NATGRID and NIA will function independent of NCTC, one must not forget that every state has its own dedicated counter terrorism unit with dangerously overlapping mandates. In such a scenario one wonders what is that one new feature which that makes it absolutely necessary for India to have one more counter terrorism agency. If all these agencies together or even independent of each other have been able to tackle the menace of terrorism only to a particular extent, there is little chance that the formation of NCTC in its current form would make India terror proof.

While the states are opposing NCTC on the grounds of federal autonomy, for a ground level intelligence officer, it’s a case of too many cooks spoiling the broth. NCTC is mandated with two powers which will potentially prove to be a bane of existence for NCTC itself, as well as others operating in the same space.

The memo issued by the home ministry states that “The officers of the Operations Division of the NCTC shall have the power to arrest and the power to search under Section 43A of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.”

Be it NIA, local ATS, CBI, Enforcement Directorate, DRI, or local police – every single state level or central agency has as similar or exact mandate. Agencies like NIA and Maharashtra or Gujarat ATS are like mirror images of what the proposed NCTC is as they are already exercising the power of search, seizure and arrest under the UAPA as well as gathering counter terrorism inputs. One doesn’t expect NCTC to anything drastically different from those with which it will have to co-exist.

Home Ministry had announced the formation of NIA weeks after 26/11 attacks with a similar intention. From first person accounts, I have gathered the NIA is still trying to find its footing. For instance NIA is facing severe manpower crunch, hostility from regional anti-terror units, absence of a credible and exclusive data base of informers and suspects. Barring a few independent fake currency cases in the North East and the Delhi Blast case, NIA is now looking into cases which are handed over from either a local investigation unit or the CBI. In such a scenario, it is doubtful if things would be any different for the NCTC.

Cross over to NCTC. NCTC’s primary concentration would be on both intelligence and investigation related to counter terrorism. On the same mandate of counter terrorism, agencies like Delhi Special Cell and Maharashtra ATS are seen to step into each-other’s area of operation fatally affecting a potentially successful operation, it is very unlikely that NCTC will be an exception. If NCTC has to justify its existence it will have to snatch someone else’s pie. It will otherwise find it difficult to justify the power to search, seize and arrest.

The home ministry has suggested that specialised officers from the IB will be absorbed in the NCTC. The same officers who would earlier co-ordinate with state level agencies will now be staunch opponents. Operators, irrespective of which agency they belong to, will be vying for the same terror suspect, same piece of evidence, and the same informer. One example of this is the manner in which Malegaon 2006 case has shaped up. The case has been under investigation by multiple agencies – from local Malegaon police to Maharashtra ATS to the CBI (twice) and now with the NIA. While the NIA is trying hard to unravel new evidence in the same areas which have been investigated previously, it is also trying to buy out informers from IB or Military Intelligence, first by threatening informers with arrest and then later bullying the informers to work for them. This is by and large a common practice adopted by investigating agencies. However, one more in the fray won’t really ensure some path breaking information. An informer works for money and loyalty. While he may take money from more than one agency, he is known to share the crucial information or lead with whom he is most loyal to. NCTC will have an uphill task on that front.

The government is perhaps hoping that with the induction of IB officials into the NCTC it will also ensure some degree of smoothness in sharing of inter-agency intelligence and informers. There appears to have assumed something in theory which is perhaps not a very sound practical solution. For most of the intelligence operators, intelligence input is like a girl friend that they would never want to part with.

The second aspect of NCTC’s mandate is – “The NCTC shall have the power to seek information, including documents, reports, transcripts, cyber information and information of every other kind in whatever form, from any agency furnishing or obliged to furnish such information. The agency furnishing or obliged to furnish the information may do so under such conditions of confidentiality as may be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.”

Simply put in a lay man’s language, this part of the mandate means – you (local police and ATS units) go ahead and do the ground work, gather evidence, tap resources, source out documents etc. and We (NCTC) will feed from your hard work and take over the case and then claim victory. This part of the NCTC’s power is and will directly affect the morale of officers working on the ground. Potentially talented officers may even cease to work if ultimately all their hard work is going to be handed over to someone else. Assuming that some officers are willing to join NCTC on deputation, chances of their parent agencies relieving them are very bleak. After all which agency will want its star investigator to leave for the benefit of some other investigating force? Classic example is that of NIA which had initially taken officers from the CBI and local police. While the CBI has nearly stopped sending their man to NIA on deputation, local police is dealing with inter departmental transfer conflicts.

If launched, NCTC will have to feed on the leftovers of other agencies. Its leaders will have to coax the government to handover cases from other agencies in order to justify its existence. Assuming cases are forcefully taken away from local investigating teams, important cases are bound to face delays, and quality of investigation will suffer.

No investigator worth his salt joins forces merely for law and order maintenance. It is the kick of investigation and thrill of the unravelling terror conspiracies, joining the dots which lead you right up to the terrorist that serve as incentives for the officers to keep going.


By all accounts, NCTC appears to be a half-baked organisation with dangerously overlapping mandates. It may serve well for the government to not hasten its launch and add to the existing chaos within the intelligence set up. Rather Home ministry should review the form and format of the agency. Ideally NCTC should be made independent of all the agencies with the main objective of co-ordinating, collating and analysing the intelligence inputs gathered from the various agencies across the country. It should report directly the PMO with ‘action to be taken’ recommendations.

Advantages –

Informers will not have a dearth of agencies. If he is unhappy with one agency, he can very well go to another. Most informers are known to do this. Now they will have one more agency’s coffers to dip into.

Because it will be under the Intelligence Bureau NCTC will not have a problem in accessing intelligence archives. The IB will be bound to share a good chunk of data.